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Abstract We investigate how market shares change when a new, superior
technology exhibiting network externalities is introduced in a market initially
dominated by an old technology. This is done under the assumption that consumers
are heterogeneous in their valuation of technology quality and network externalities
and that goods are not (perfectly) durable and thus have to be bought repeatedly.
When both technologies are unsponsored, the old technology dominates when the
quality difference is small, and it disappears when the quality difference is large.
When the new technology is sponsored, the relationship between the quality
difference and the long-run market share of the new technology is non-monotonic
and the old technology always continues to exist.
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JEL Classification L1 . L13 . D43
1 Introduction
The value individuals attach to consuming many technological products (such as
telephones, software and hardware) or products that require maintenance depends on
how many others are using these goods. This phenomenon is known as network
externality. In the literature, it is well-known that network externalities may create
barriers to entry, preventing adoption of new goods, possibly of a higher quality.
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This can lead to the society being “locked-in” with an inefficient technology. A
classical—although, according to some (e.g. Liebowitz and Margolis 1990),
mistaken—example is the QWERTY standard commonly used in typewriters and
computer keyboards (see David 1986). Nuclear power reactors in Europe are another
example—the dominant technology is light water, although many scientists consider
it to be inferior to heavy water or gas graphite technology (Cowan 1990).
In many situations, the importance of network externalities for the individual
adoption decision will differ between different consumers. An important reason for
this differentiation is that people use the same technology in a variety of ways, and
some require more coordination than others. In the QWERTY example, a large
company with many typists and a high rotation of personnel will care more about the
network externality than a free-lance journalist, who uses her keyboard herself and
for whom typing speed is important. Similarly, a scientist who frequently writes
papers together with his colleagues will care more about the possibility of
exchanging files than someone who works primarily alone. In the existing literature
on technology adoption, however, consumer heterogeneity with respect to their
valuation is usually not modeled. Typically, in models with horizontally non-
differentiated goods, consumers are either homogenous (as, e.g., in Farrell and
Saloner 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986a, 1992), or they have identical preferences
with respect to network externalities (as, e.g., in Farrell and Saloner 1985; Cabral
1990; Agliardi 1994). Another typical feature of existing models is the assumption
that users are “stuck” forever (or at least for a long time) with the technology they
choose (e.g. Farrell and Saloner 1985, 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986a, b, 1992).
In this paper, we study the classical question concerning the possibility of “lock-
in” in markets where consumers value network externalities. We do this under two
novel assumptions. First, we assume that the consumers’ valuation of network
externalities and quality is heterogeneous across the population.1 Second, we assume
that users adopt (buy) a technology in every period, and thus they cannot be stuck
with their past purchases and do not incur any switching costs. The motivation for
this assumption is twofold. First, it extends the analysis of technology adoption to
markets of goods which are not durable. One can think here of goods, such as
software, which depreciate fast, e.g. due to technological progress, like software.
Another group of products to which our analysis may apply are goods of immediate
consumption, such as entertainment goods, where network externalities arise due to
social considerations. Second, it shows that inefficiencies in technology adoption can
arise even if users can switch between technologies costlessly.
Specific questions that we ask here are: is it possible that the new technology is
not adopted by anyone, despite its higher quality? If it attracts some users, under
what conditions will the new technology take over the market? Does there exist an
equilibrium with both technologies present? We also investigate the market shares
when the new technology is sponsored by a provider that chooses prices to
maximize long-run profits.
To answer these questions, we study a model with two products, an old, inferior
good and a new, superior good. We assume that quality can be objectively measured
1De Palma and Leruth (1996) also model heterogeneous network externalities, but they do not allow for
heterogeneity in the valuation of quality, nor do they study the introduction of a new technology.
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and that consumers differ in their valuation of quality. This means that if product A
is of a higher quality than product B, then everyone regards A to be better than B,
but for some people, the quality difference is relatively more important than for
others. Users differ also in their valuation of network externalities. One could think
here for instance of software: some users care mostly about speed, reliability or user-
friendliness, whereas for others the ability to exchange files with colleagues or to
move them between computers is more important. The valuation for quality is
independent of the valuation for network externalities. Consumers decide in every
period which good to buy solely on the basis of the present (net) expected utility.
We study the questions outlined above in two different environments. First, in
Section 3, we address the pure demand side effect by considering technology
adoption in a world where technology is competitively provided and firms are
passive. Second, in Section 4, we study the situation in which the new technology is
introduced by a profit-maximizing firm, while maintaining the assumption of
competitively provided old technology. This assumption, also made by, e.g., Katz
and Shapiro (1986a) and Farrell and Saloner (1986), can be justified on the grounds
that the new technology is protected by a patent, while the patent on the old
technology has already expired so that it is provided competitively, with all firms
taking prices as given.2
In every period, market shares adjust to their equilibrium values given the price of
the new technology in that period and the market share at the beginning of the
period. Our basic results are as follows. When both technologies are not sponsored,
two equilibrium market shares may emerge: if the difference in qualities is larger
than a certain threshold value, the new technology will be the unique technology in
the market. If the quality advantage is lower than this threshold value, the two
technologies co-exist and the entrant will have the smallest market share. It is easy to
see why the new technology has to have the whole market if it has a market share
larger than half: if both quality and market share of one technology are higher, all
consumers derive more utility from this product than from the other and, hence, will
switch to this new technology. The possible emergence of two equilibrium market
shares and the discontinuous jump of market shares at the threshold value are the
main results of this section.
Section 4 examines whether these results continue to hold when the new
technology is protected by a patent and provided by a price-setting firm. Unlike in
the basic model, the market share of the new technology is now non-monotonic in
the quality advantage. When the quality difference is small, the long-run market
share of the new technology remains small. When the quality difference takes
intermediate values, the sponsor of the new technology is able to get a large market
share and keep it in the long run. When the quality difference becomes large, the
firm can earn a higher profit by raising price to a level at which fewer people with a
low valuation of quality adopt the new technology, which allows it to extract more
2In a discussion paper (Janssen and Mendys 2000), we analyze the situation where both technologies are
sponsored in the case when consumers’ valuation for quality and network externalities are inversely
correlated. With the independent valuations assumed in this article, the analysis becomes analytically
intractable.
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surplus from the quality-loving consumers. Therefore, the fact that the new
technology is sponsored results in its having a lower market share.
We also analyze welfare properties of the different equilibrium configurations.
Social welfare is maximized when the new technology takes over the whole market.
This only happens when the technologies are unsponsored and when the quality
difference is high enough. In both the unsponsored and sponsored case, the
introduction of a new technology decreases welfare if its quality advantage is small,
and it increases welfare when its quality advantage is large.
Since the literature on technology adoption in the presence of network
externalities is extensive, we devote a separate section to a brief overview. This is
done in Section 2. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 on
unsponsored technologies considers the pure demand effects due to heterogeneous
network externalities. This section allows us to illustrate the main concepts in a
relatively simple setting. Section 4 introduces the sponsor of the new technology.
Section 5 concludes. Most proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
The seminal papers on the adoption of a new, incompatible technology are those by
Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1986a, b), followed by Katz
and Shapiro (1992) and many others. Just as in this paper, two situations are
typically studied: in one, technologies are provided by a competitive industry at
marginal cost, while in the other, technologies are sponsored. Another way to
classify the literature is to distinguish the models where the total number of users
remains constant and the network of the new technology arises due to consumers
switching from old to new technology (e.g. Farrell and Saloner 1985, 1986; Agliardi
1994; Michihiro 1998), from those where a technology is adopted only once and the
new network can arise due to the arrival of new generations (Farrell and Saloner
1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986a, b, 1992; Choi 1994, 1997; De Bijl and Goyal 1995;
Regibeau and Rockett 1996). In some of the switching models, the decision to
remain in the old network may be changed later, whereas the choice of the new
technology is irreversible (Farrell and Saloner 1985).
The literature shows that both too much adoption (excess momentum) and too
little (excess inertia) can take place. Consider the case of unsponsored technologies.
Excess inertia may arise because users are not sure whether they will be followed if
they switch (Farrell and Saloner 1985), because they expect others not to switch
(Katz and Shapiro 1992) or because they are not willing to bear a temporary loss of
network benefits (Farrell and Saloner 1986). In general, excess inertia follows from
the fact that individuals do not take into account the positive effect that their
adoption of the new technology would have on others. In models with several
generations excess inertia can also take place because the users who arrive first do
not wait for the new technology to appear (Choi 1994, 1997; Choi and Thum 1998),
or choose the technology that is cheaper now, instead of one that is expected to be
cheaper in the future (Katz and Shapiro 1986b). This decreases the welfare of
younger users, who must either lose the network of the old users, or use the less
efficient technology.
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Excess momentum, on the other hand, often arises because, as some users adopt
the new technology, those who continue to use the old technology are left with a
smaller network (Farrell and Saloner 1986; De Bijl and Goyal 1995; Choi 1994). It
can also arise if users have heterogeneous preferences and if it is only possible to
commit to the new technology (Farrell and Saloner 1985). In that case, those with a
preference for the new technology will switch and the other users may be forced to
switch to their less preferred technology. In general, excess momentum arises
because users who adopt a new technology do not take into account the negative
effect that they have on old users, or on those who will switch later.
New technology sponsorship does not systematically increase or decrease
efficiency. Sponsorship can give the new technology an advantage if both
technologies are always present, but the old one has a cost (or quality) advantage
now, and the new one later (Katz and Shapiro 1986a). In that case, the new producer
can price below cost first to build an installed base and raise prices later. On the
other hand, if only the new technology is sponsored and is not available in the first
period, early users may be unwilling to adopt it because they will expect to be
exploited by its sponsor in the future (Choi and Thum 1998). When the timing of the
introduction of the new technology is a decision variable, the new technology will
tend to be introduced too early, because its sponsor does not take into account the
lost network benefits of consumers of the old technology, and the profits of the
incumbent (Katz and Shapiro 1992; Regibeau and Rockett 1996).
In the model presented in this paper, the new network arises due to switching, and
the cases of both unsponsored technologies and sponsored new technology are
studied. Unlike in some models described above, excess momentum is not possible
in our model, since the optimal outcome has all users switching to the new
technology. That is because, for a given network size, the new technology is
preferred by everyone, and because switching is costless. On the other hand, excess
inertia can arise when users expect that it will be the case. Sponsorship exacerbates
the inertia because a profit-maximizing firm may prefer to extract more surplus from
consumers with a high valuation of quality rather than gain as large a market share as
possible.
3 Unsponsored technologies
In this section, we describe the demand side in detail and show whether and if so to
what extent a new technology will be adopted in markets where the valuations of
network size and quality are heterogeneous. We assume here that both technologies
are competitively provided, that is, their presence is not connected to any particular
seller and their prices are equal to marginal cost (which we assume to be zero). In
this section we also define the concept of a stable equilibrium given the initial
market share, which we will use in the rest of the paper. We explicitly show how
stable equilibrium market shares depend on the quality difference between both
technologies.
The technology that consumers buy lasts one period. In each period, therefore,
consumers decide whether or not to adopt one of the available technologies. Each
consumer chooses the technology that maximizes expected utility in that period.
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As explained in the Introduction, all consumers care about quality and about
network externalities, but the importance of these factors varies across consumers.
The utility from consuming nothing is zero, while the actual utility from consuming
each technology depends on its quality, market share (which represents network
externalities), and the consumer’s type, given by a pair of coefficients (α,β). More
precisely,
u1θ xtð Þ ¼ vþ αq1 þ βxt for the new technology; and
u0θ xtð Þ ¼ vþ αq0 þ β 1 xtð Þ for the old technology;
where ν>0 is the basic valuation for any technology, q1>q0>0 are qualities of the
new and old technology and xt∈ (0, 1) is the market share of the new technology in
period t. Since adopting a technology gives always non-negative utility, the market is
covered, and we take 1−xt to be the market share of the old technology. The
coefficient α determines the consumer’s valuation of quality, while β is the valuation
of popularity. We assume that α and β are independently and uniformly distributed
on the interval (0,1). As the market shares in period t are unknown at the beginning
of the period when consumers decide which technology to adopt, we denote by
E ua;b tð Þ
 
the expected utility of consumer (α,β) in period t and it follows that
E uα;β tð Þ
  ¼ E u
1
α;β tð Þ
h i
¼ u1α;β tð Þ
E u0α;β tð Þ
h i
¼ u0α;β tð Þ
0
if α;βð Þ consumes the new technology;
if α;βð Þ consumes the old technology;
if α;βð Þ consumes no technology:
8><
>:
The sequencing of actions is as follows. Initially, only the old technology is
available in the market, and everyone is consuming it. At the beginning of the game
the new, better technology becomes available to consumers, who then make a choice
based on comparison of expected utilities. A consumer of type (α,β) chooses the
new technology, if and only if,
vþ αq1 þ βExt  vþ αq0 þ β 1 Extð Þ;
where Ext is the expected market share of the new technology in period t. We define
an equilibrium of this model as a situation in which (1) every consumer maximizes
his (expected) utility given his expectations about market share and (2) the
expectations are fulfilled. More formally,
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a pair (Ex,x) such that
1. Each consumer (α,β) maximizes E ua;b tð Þ
 
given Ext=Ex,
2. Ex=x.
In the case of unsponsored technologies, equilibria can be easily characterized.
Let q ¼ q1  q0. If there exists a set of indifferent consumers (α*, β*), then it must
be true that there exist pairs (α*, β*), 0<α*<1 and 0<β*<1, such that
aq ¼ b 1 2Extð Þ ð1Þ
and all consumers with α  β 1 2Extð Þ=q (and only those) choose the new
technology. Note that, in equilibrium, either x=1, or x<1/2. If 1/2<x<1, then all
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consumers prefer the new technology, which is a contradiction. The distribution of
consumers among both technologies for xt<1/2 is shown in Fig. 1.
Since α and β are uniformly distributed, the market share of the new technology
is equal to the area of the shaded triangle. Observe that 0<xt<1/2 implies
1 > q= 1 2Extð Þ > 0. Thus, in equilibrium
x ¼ 0:5q= 1 2xð Þ;
which after transformation gives a quadratic equation that can be solved for x.
2x2 þ x 0:5q ¼ 0 ð2Þ
Basically, two possibilities emerge:
a. If q≥0.25, then Eq. 2 has no solution with x<1. In this case, the only equilibrium
is x=1.
b. If q<0.25, then Eq. 2 has two solutions: x1 ¼ 1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
14q
p
4 and x2 ¼
1þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
14q
p
4 .
If the expectations of consumers are rational, the game is essentially static:
consumers correctly predict the equilibrium market shares. If multiple equilibria are
possible, the outcome will depend on which equilibrium is expected to arise. We
consider a dynamic adjustment process where boundedly rational consumers have
adaptive expectations, with Ext ¼ xt1. In that case the equilibrium that is eventually
reached depends on the initial conditions. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamic process
when the quality advantage of the new technology is q<0.25.
From the Figure it is clear that x1 is the stable equilibrium for x0<x2, and x=1 is
the stable equilibrium if x0>x2. x2 is also an equilibrium, but it is not stable: a very
small change in market share in either direction would make the system converge to
either x1, or x=1. Using this dynamic analysis, we may define a stable equilibrium
given an initial market share of x0 as follows:
Definition 2 A stable equilibrium given an initial market share of x0 is a pair (Ex,x)
which (1) satisfies Definition 1 and (2) emerges as the stable outcome of the dynamic
Fig. 1 Distribution of two technologies
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model in which consumers’ expectations are given by Ext ¼ xt1 and the initial
market share of the new technology is x0.
The above analysis can then be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 The stable equilibrium market share given x0=0 is
x ¼ 1 if q  0:25
x ¼ 1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
14q
p
4 if q < 0:25:
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium market share of the new technology as a function
of its quality advantage. The equilibrium market share of the new technology will be
either 1, or less than 0.25. Which of them arises depends on the quality difference. A
larger quality advantage leads to a larger market share, which is quite intuitive.
However, the market share does not increase continuously with the quality
difference: there is a critical value, q ¼ 0:25, such that, if q < q, the equilibrium
market share is less than 0.25, and if q > q, the new technology gains the whole
market. This is caused by the critical mass effect: once the new technology has a
sufficiently large market, it will be preferred by all types of consumers, not only
those with a taste for quality. Moreover, we see that, if q>0, the better technology
always has some market share. This follows from the idea that there are some
consumers who care almost only about quality.
We now compare social welfare before and after the introduction of the new
technology. In the case of unsponsored technology, the welfare is equal to the sum of
individual consumer surpluses. Note that, since the market is always covered, the
surplus must always be at least v, the sum of consumers’ basic valuations. When
everyone consumes only one technology, the total surplus is
SW ¼ vþ ∫
0
1
∫
0
1
αq0 þ βð Þdαdβ ¼ vþ q0 þ 1ð Þ=2;
Fig. 2 The dynamic process when the quality advantage of the new technology is q<0.25
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before the introduction of the new technology, and
SW ¼ vþ ∫
0
1
∫
0
1
αq1 þ βð Þdαdβ ¼ vþ q1 þ 1ð Þ=2;
if everyone uses the new technology. Thus, the surplus change in case everyone
switches to the new technology is ΔSW ¼ q=2 > 0. This is the situation in which
social welfare is maximized: everyone uses the technology of the highest quality and
enjoys maximum network benefits.
If the new technology has only a small market share in equilibrium, the welfare
effect is not obvious: the consumers who use the new technology in the equilibrium
derive more utility from its quality, but they lose a large part of the network
externality. The remaining consumers do not gain anything in terms of quality and
they lose a part of the network benefits.
The net effect on total surplus is calculated by the surplus change for the users of
the new technology
ΔCS1 ¼ ∫
0
q
12x
∫
12x
q β
1
αq1 þ βx αq0 þ βð Þð Þdαdβ ¼ 1 3xð Þq
2
6 1 2xð Þ2 ¼
3
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 4qp þ 1ð Þq2
6
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 4qp þ 1ð Þ2
> 0;
and for the users of the old technology
ΔCS0 ¼ ∫
0
q
12x
∫
0
12x
q β
βxð Þdαdβþ∫
q
12x
1
∫
0
1
βxð Þdαdβ ¼
q2  3 1 2xð Þ2
 
x
6 1 2xð Þ2 ¼
¼ 4q
2 þ 12q 6 6 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi1 4qpð Þ 1 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi1 4qpð Þ
24 1þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi1 4qpð Þ2 < 0:
Fig. 3 The equilibrium market share of the new technology
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Thus, the total welfare change equals
ΔSW ¼  q 3 2qð Þ 1þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1 4qpð Þ
12 1 2qþ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi1 4qpð Þ < 0:
Thus, if the equilibrium market share of the new technology is small, the loss of
network benefits dominates the gain from higher quality and social welfare
decreases. The larger the equilibrium market share of the new technology, the larger
the loss.
The bold line in Fig. 4 shows how social welfare in equilibrium depends on the
quality difference, given that the quality of the old technology, q0, is fixed. The
welfare before the introduction of the new technology is represented by the horizontal
line, and the diagonal dashed line shows welfare in the optimum, which, for higher q,
coincides with the equilibrium outcome. As q increases, equilibrium social welfare
changes nonmonotonically. Initially it decreases and moves away from the social
optimum, because the market share of the new technology grows, and network
benefits for users of the old technology fall. When q reaches its critical value, the
social optimum is achieved where the new technology gets the whole market.
4 Sponsored new technology
In this section, we analyze the case where the new technology is put on the market
by a firm that sets prices to maximize profits. The old technology is still
unsponsored and available at price zero. To study the changing incentives of the
firm as its market share changes, we consider an infinite price-setting process, in
which, in every period T, first the firm chooses the price, and then the equilibrium
market share given initial x0 is determined by the dynamic adjustment process
described in Section 3, where consumers make their decisions by comparing net
utilities.
Fig. 4 Social welfare change
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After the firm has chosen its price, consumers make their choices, comparing the
net expected period T utilities from choosing each technology:
E u1θ Tð Þ
  pT ¼ vþ αq1 þ βExT  pT
E u0θ Tð Þ
  ¼ vþ αq0 þ β 1 ExTð Þ: ð3Þ
Since the price is set in every period T, new stable equilibria and new market shares
may arise in every period. As a stable equilibrium market share depends on the
initial market share, the market share in period T influences the market share in
period T+1.
At the beginning of every period T, the firm sets the price in order to maximize its
total discounted profits. Thus, the firm maximizes
9 ¼
X1
T¼1
δT19T ;
where δ∈[0,1) is a discount factor and ΠT is the firm’s profit in period T. Since
production costs are zero, per-period profits are
ΠT ¼ pTxT :
The outcome of the maximalization will be a sequence of prices and market
shares, pT ; xT½ 1T¼1. We first derive the per-period demand function for the new
technology, i.e. the stable equilibrium market share which arises in each period given
the price of the new technology and initial market shares. Next, we describe the
optimal pricing strategy of the firm.
To calculate demand, we use the same definitions of stable equilibrium market
shares as in Section 3. From Eq. 3 it follows that a consumer (α,β) chooses the new
technology, if
aqþ β 2ExT  1ð Þ  pT  0:
Note first that everyone prefers the new technology if and only if ExT>1/2 and pT =0,
whereas everyone prefers the old technology if and only if ExT<1/2 and pT>q. It
follows that, if pT=0, there exists an equilibrium with xT=1, while if pT>q, there exists
an equilibrium with xT=0. In both cases, there might also exist other equilibria, in
which 0<xT<1. When 0<pT<q, only such equilibria are possible. Depending on the
values of pT and q, five types of situations (and potential equilibria) with 0<xT<1 exist.
These types are illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6. The shaded area shows the consumers who
prefer the new technology given the expected market share Ext (and thus its resulting
market share in subperiod t, xt), while the remaining consumers have a preference for
the old technology. In equilibrium, Ext=xt.
Note that the situation represented in Fig. 6a cannot be an equilibrium: it is clear
from the figure that xT<1/2, which contradicts xT ¼ ExT > pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2. That
leaves four possible equilibria to be considered. The eventual outcomes depend on
the value of q, the quality difference between technologies. Lemmas 1–3
characterize the demand function of the firm for different values of the quality
difference q. The proof of Lemma 2, the most difficult one, can be found in the
Appendix; other proofs are available upon request.
Evolution of market shares with repeated purchases and heterogeneous network externalities 561
Fig. 5 a pT<q and Ext < pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2. b pT<q and pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2 < Ext < pT þ 1ð Þ=2. c pT <q and
Ext > pT þ 1ð Þ=2
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Lemma 1 Suppose that q>1. The demand function of the firm in period T is
– xT ¼ 0 if pT > q;
– xT ¼ q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p
4q
if q2

qþ 1ð Þ < pT  q;
– xT ¼ 2q 2pT  12 q 1ð Þ if q= qþ 1ð Þ < pT  q
2

qþ 1ð Þ;
– xT ¼ 3qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4p2Tð Þ
p
4q
if pT  q= qþ 1ð Þ:
Fig. 6 a pT>q and Ext > pT þ 1ð Þ=2. b pT>q and pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2 < Ext < pT þ 1ð Þ=2
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Lemma 2 Suppose that 0.25≤q≤1. The demand function of the firm in period T is
– xT ¼ 0 if pT > q;
– xT ¼ q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2Tþ8pT qþq4q2ð Þ
p
4q if pT >
ffiffiffi
q
p 
2, or
– xT ¼ 3qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q4p2T1ð Þ
p
4q otherwise.
Lemma 3 Suppose that q<0.25. The demand function of the firm in period T is
1. If pT>q
–
– xT ¼ 3þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
4q8pTþ1
p
4 otherwise.
2. If pT <q
– xT ¼ q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2Tþ8pT qþq4q2ð Þ
p
4q ,
– xT ¼ 3qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q4p2Tð Þ
p
4q otherwise.
Figures 7a–c illustrate Lemmas 1–3, showing the market share of the firm as a
function of its price. In comparison to the case of unsponsored new technology, two
additional equilibrium market shares are possible: no entry of the new superior good,
xT=0, and a market share of the new technology that is larger than half, but smaller
than 1. When the price of the new technology is larger than zero, some potential
customers will not find it worthwhile to buy it even if they have a preference for
high quality and a large network.
The shape of the demand function depends on the value of the quality difference
between technologies. Most striking is the difference between the cases q>1 and
0.25<q<1. For large q, the demand function is continuous and each price can only
lead to one value of demand, which is not the case if q<1. The reason is that, for
large q, network externalities, which are the cause of the discontinuity, are relatively
xT ¼ 0; if pT  4qþ 1ð Þ=8; or
if q  pT < 4qþ 1ð Þ=8 and xT1 < 3 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi4q 8pT þ 1pð Þ=4:
if pT > q= qþ 1ð Þ and xT1 < 3q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4p2T1
 	q .
4q; or
if q2

qþ 1ð Þ < pT < q= qþ 1ð Þ and xT1 < 1 2qþ 2pTð Þ= 2 1 qð Þ½ ; or
if pT < q2

qþ 1ð Þ and xT1< q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p .
4q;
if q= qþ 1ð Þ < pT < ffiffiffiqp 2 and xT1 < 3q ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq q4p2TÞð Þp .4q; or
if q2

qþ 1ð Þ < pT < q= qþ 1ð Þ and xT1< 1 2qþ 2pTð Þ= 2 1 qð Þ½ ; or
if 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 < pT < q2 qþ 1ð Þ and xT1
< qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p .
4q;
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less important. The total value of network externalities, βx or β(1−xT), cannot be
larger than one, while the total value of increased quality, αq, is larger than one for at
least some consumers. Therefore, the demand function for the case q>1 resembles
the demand function for the case where no network externalities are present (thus
β=0 for all consumers). For a comparison, we depict this demand function,
described by the expression xT ¼ 1 p=q, in Fig. 7a as a dashed line. Compared to
the case with β=0, the presence of network externalities increases the elasticity of
demand, except for the case when p is very low or very high. In these cases, the
consumers of the new technology benefit from large network externalities and
therefore are more reluctant to switch away from it when its price goes up.
When q<1, network externalities are relatively more important in determining the
consumers’ choice, leading to a multiplicity of equilibrium market shares for a given
a b
c
Fig. 7 a q>1. b 0.25<q<1. c q<0.25
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price. Whenever two equilibria are possible, the upper curve of the demand
correspondence represents the case where high quality has a high initial market
share. For a certain critical price, ep, the demand function will jump from the upper
segment of the demand function to the lower one. The discontinuity point depends
positively on the initial market share.
We now proceed to describing the optimal price path for the sponsor of the new
technology. As the firm sets its prices to maximize total profits, Π ¼P1T¼1 dT1ΠT ,
and as profits in period T are equal to ΠT ¼ pTxT pT ; xT1ð Þ, past prices influence the
current profits through the impact on today’s market share. Clearly, a large initial
market share is an advantage: at given prices in the two-equilibrium range, a larger
initial market share results in a larger demand.
Proposition 2 characterizes the optimum prices of the sponsor of the new
technology for different values of q.
Proposition 2 There3 are parameters q″′<q″<q′ and θ, such that the optimal pricing
path for the sponsor of new technology is as follows.
1. If q  q0; then pT ¼ pm for T ¼ 1; 2 . . .
2. If q00  q < q0; then pT ¼ pl for T ¼ 1; 2 . . .
3. If q000 < q < q00; then pT ¼ pu for T ¼ 1 and pT ¼ pl for T ¼ 2; 3; . . .
4. If 1=4 < q < q000; then p1 ¼ pu for T ¼ 1 and
p1 ¼ pl for T ¼ 2; 3; . . . if δ > δ;4
p1 ¼ ps for all T ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . . if δ < δ: 4.
5. q < 0:25; then p1 ¼ ps for all T ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .
where pm ¼ 2q 1ð Þ=4, pl ¼ ffiffiffiffiffi2qp ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  5p .8, pu ¼ 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 and ps ¼
2q=3 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq 4qþ 9ð Þp 6 	 cos πþ θð Þ=3ð Þ.
The next two Figures illustrate Proposition 2. Figure 8 shows the optimal price,
and Fig. 9 the resulting market share of the new technology as a function of q. In
both figures, the dotted line represents the optimal price and the resulting market
share, respectively, when network externalities are absent.
Figure 8 shows the intuitive notion that the larger the quality difference, the larger
the price the provider of the superior technology charges. It is interesting to note
that, apart from an intermediate range of quality difference [0.25, q″], the optimal
price is constant over time and varies only with the exogenous quality difference.
When the quality difference is very small, this price is very small and equal to ps,
represented in the Figure by the bold curvature. When the quality difference is
somewhat larger, the optimal pricing structure depends on the discount factor. If the
future is valued enough, i.e., if δ is large enough, the optimal pricing path is such
that, in the first period, a low undercutting price pu is asked, represented in the
3The exact values are q0 ¼ ffiffiffiffiffi17p þ 3 	4, q0 0 ¼ 3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p þ 3þ 4 ffiffiffi2p ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  5p .32, q0 0 0 ¼ 6 ffiffiffi3p  9 	4
and θ is implicitly defined by cos θ ¼ 2q 4qþ 27ð Þ 4qþ 9ð Þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq 4qþ 9ð Þp 	.
4Where δ* is such that Πu þ δ*= 1 δ*ð ÞΠl ¼ 1= 1 δ*ð ÞΠs with Πu ¼ pux pu; xT1 < 0:25ð Þ, Πl ¼
plx pl ; xT1 > 0:75
 	
and Πs ¼ psx ps; xT1 < 0:25ð Þ.
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Figure by the dashed line, to gain a substantial market share and a large price pl,
represented in the Figure by the thin curvature, ever after. If the discount factor is
relatively low, it is better for the provider of the new technology to set one constant,
somewhat moderate, price ps. When the quality difference is larger, i.e., q>q″′, it is
optimal, for all discount factors, to start with a low price in period 1 and continue
with a large price from period 2 onwards. When the quality difference grows, the
Fig. 9 Market share as a function of q
Fig. 8 Optimal price as a function of q
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undercutting price pu and the large price pl converge towards one another when the
quality difference increases, and from q″ they coincide.
An interesting outcome, illustrated in Fig. 9, is that the market share is non-
monotonic in q. The long-run market share (all segments drawn in continuous line)
first increases, then stays constant, and then decreases in q. A higher q has a two-fold
effect on the firm’s market share. The direct effect is positive: a higher q leads to a
higher x for a given price. The indirect effect is negative: a higher q leads to a higher
optimal price, which impacts market share negatively. When there are no network
externalities (see the dotted line), the two effects exactly cancel each other so that the
market share stays constant. The firm chooses its price so that it serves only people
with a relatively high valuation of quality.
With network externalities, the relationship between the two effects becomes
more complicated. For small q and a small market share, the direct positive effect
dominates. For intermediate q, both effects cancel out, but at a much higher market
share than without network externalities. The firm keeps a large market share in
order to attract not only consumers with a high valuation of quality, but also those
with a low valuation of quality but high willingness to pay for network externalities.
When the quality difference becomes very large, it becomes more profitable to give
up this last group of consumers in order to be able to extract more surplus from
quality-loving consumers.
Consider now the long-run welfare change when the new technology is sponsored.
The welfare change is equal to the change in gross consumers surplus of consumers
who choose the new technology, ΔGCS1, and in the consumer surplus of consumers
of old technology ΔCS0. Just as in the case of unsponsored technologies, the social
welfare is maximized when everyone adopts the new technology. However, unlike in
that case, this never happens when the new technology is sponsored. Proposition 3
describes the welfare change as a consequence of the introduction of the new
technology.
Fig. 10 Social welfare when the new technology is sponsored
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Proposition 3 The introduction of the new technology increases (decreases) social
welfare in the long run if q > q0 q < 0:25ð Þ. If 0.25<q<q″′, social welfare increases
if, and only if the new technology has a dominant market share.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Fig. 10. In all three distinguished cases, gross
surplus of consumers of the new technology increases, indicating that the increase in
surplus due to higher quality is larger than the decrease due to the loss of network
externalities. The surplus of the consumers of the old technology decreases, because
they only experience the loss of network externalities. The net change in social
welfare depends on whether or not the new technology gains a large market share.
5 Conclusions
We have examined the adoption of technology in a market where consumers have to
make a purchasing decision in every period and have different valuations of both
network size and quality. In Section 3, we considered the case of unsponsored
technologies, and in Section 4, we analyzed the implication of the new technology
being supplied by a profit-maximizing seller. We showed that, even though
consumers are not stuck with past purchases, the better technology may not gain
the whole market in equilibrium, due to lagging expectations. We also found that
market outcomes depend on the quality advantage of the new technology. In the case
of unsponsored new technology, the higher the quality difference, the higher the
market share of the new technology. There is a critical value such that, for larger
quality differences, the new superior technology will be used in the whole market,
and for lower quality differences, the old technology remains dominant in the
market.
When the new technology is sponsored, the relationship between the quality
difference and the long-run market share becomes non-monotonic. The market
share initially increases, but then decreases as the quality difference increases.
The reason is that, for intermediate q, the firm finds it profitable to serve not only
the consumers with a high valuation for quality, but also those with a low valuation
of quality and high valuation of network externalities. When the quality difference is
large, the firm prefers to give up the consumers who care mostly about network
externalities in order to extract more surplus from those who care much about
quality.
The introduction of the new technology does not necessarily increase social
welfare. When the quality difference is small and the equilibrium market share of
the new technology small, the gain of consumers who switch to the new
technology does not outweigh the loss in network externalities for consumers who
do not switch. When the new technology has a much higher quality, its
introduction increases social welfare. However, the social optimum, in which
everyone uses the new technology, can only be achieved when the new technology
is unsponsored.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2 For this case, we have to consider potential equilibria represented
in Figs. 5 and 6. We have already shown in the text that a situation as in Fig. 6a
cannot be an equilibrium. Below, in (1) we show that the other situation with pT>q-
shown in Fig. 6a—cannot be an equilibrium. This implies that the only equilibrium
for pT>q is xT=0. In (2) we analyze the potential equilibria where pT>q.
(1) Suppose that pT>q. Then, it follows from Fig. 6b that xT>0 only if
ExT > pT þ 1ð Þ=2. In this case, xT ¼ 1 pT2xT1þ 12 pT2ExT1 pTq2ExT1
 
. Substituting
ExT=xT and transforming gives the following quadratic equation:
4x2T  6xT þ 2þ 2pT  q ¼ 0: ð4Þ
Equation 4 has no solution if 4 1 8pT þ 4qð Þ < 0; thus if pT > 4qþ 1ð Þ=8. If
q > 1=4, then pT>q implies pT > 4qþ 1ð Þ=8. It follows that, when pT>q, then
there is no equilibrium with xT>0.
(2) Let x01; x
0
2; x
00; x1
000; x2
000 be defined as in the proof of Lemma 1. Note first in
situations (a) and (c) the dynamic process and equilibrium conditions are just as
in Lemma 1, with the difference that now the condition xT < pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2
for equilibrium (a) and xT > pT þ 1ð Þ=2 for equilibrium c is always satisfied. It
follows xT ¼ x01 is an equilibrium when pT > 2q
ffiffiffi
q
p 	
2, and xT ¼ x2000 is
an equilibrium when pT <
ffiffiffi
q
p 
2.
Consider now equilibrium (b). When q<1, then x″ satisfies the condition
pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2 < xT < pT þ 1ð Þ=2 if q2

qþ 1ð Þ < pT < q= qþ 1ð Þ. Observe,
however, that x″ is not stable now: analyzing the dynamic process reveals that
xt>xt−1 if xt−1>x″, and xt<xt−1 otherwise. It follows that equilibrium of type (b)
does not exist for q<1. If q=1, then for pt ¼ 1=2 every 1=4 < xT < 3=4
satisfies the equilibrium condition and can be a stable equilibrium.
Note that, when q<1, 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 < ffiffiffiqp 2, and thus there is a range of pT
where both equilibria (a) and (b) are possible. There, the eventual stable
equilibrium depends on the initial x0. For each pT there exists a critical x such
that, if xT1 < x, then the ‘low’ equilibrium (type a) arises, whereas xT1 > x
will lead to the ‘high’ equilibrium (type c). To find this critical x we need to
analyze the dynamic process in situations (a), (b) and (c). From the proof
Lemma 1 and the discussion of type (b) equilibrium above, we know that the
dynamic process is the following:
(a) If xt1 < pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2, then xt>xt−1 if xt1 < x01 or xt1 > x02 and xt<
xt−1 otherwise.
(b) If pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2 < xt1 < pT þ 1ð Þ=2, then xt<xt−1 if xt−1<x″ and xt<
xt−1 otherwise.
(c) If xt1 > pT þ 1ð Þ=2, then xt>xt−1 if x1000 < xt1 < x2000 and xt−1<xt
otherwise.
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The critical x depends on the relationship between x02( x1
00 and x1000, on the one
hand, and pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2 and pT þ 1ð Þ=2 on the other. Three subcases can arise
here:
(2.1) q= qþ 1ð Þ < pT < ffiffiffiqp 2.
In this case, x02 > pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2, x00 > pT þ 1ð Þ=2 and x1000 > pT þ 1ð Þ=2.
Figure 11 shows that the low equilibrium x1′ arises if xT1 < x1
000, and the high
equilibrium x2
000 arises if xT1 > x1
000. Hence, x ¼ x1000.
(2.2) q2

qþ 1ð Þ < pT < q= qþ 1ð Þ.
In this case, x02 > pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2, pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2 < x00 < pT þ 1ð Þ=2 and
x1
000 < pT þ 1ð Þ=2. Figure 12 shows that the low equilibrium x1′ arises if xT−1<
x″, and the high equilibrium x2
000 arises if xT−1>x″. Thus, x ¼ x000.
(2.3) 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 < pT < q2 qþ 1ð Þ.
In this case, x02 < pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2, x00 < pT  qþ 1ð Þ=2 and x1000 < pT þ 1ð Þ=2.
Figure 13 shows that the low equilibrium x1′ arises if xT1 < x02, and the high
equilibrium x2
000 arises if xT1 > x02. Thus, x ¼ x02.
Proof of Proposition 2 We calculate the optimal price path of the firm for the three
ranges of q described in Lemmas 1–3: q>1, 0.25≤q≤1 and q<0.25. We consider
these three ranges of q in turn.
Case 1 q>1. In this case, the demand function of the firm is given by Lemma 1.
Note that the market share in a given period does not depend on the market share in
the previous period, and therefore the optimal price does not depend on the initial
market share either and it will be the same in all periods. Therefore, in the proof we
drop the index T. The optimal p can take values from one of three ranges:
(a) q2

qþ 1ð Þ < p  q, (b) q= qþ 1ð Þ < p  q2 qþ 1ð Þ and (c) p  q= qþ 1ð Þ.
We consider these three ranges in turn.
(a) q2

qþ 1ð Þ < p  q. The profits are π ¼ p q ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq 4p2 þ 8pqþ q 4q2ð Þp .4q.
The first and second derivatives of this function with respect to p are
@π=@p ¼ q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2 þ 8pqþ q 4q2ð Þp
4q
 p q pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2 þ 8pqþ q 4q2ð Þp ;
and
@2π

@p2 ¼  qpffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2þ8pqþq4q2ð Þ
p  qpffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2þ8pqþq4q2ð Þ
p 
p q4p2þ8pqþq4q2ð Þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq 4p2þ8pqþq4q2ð Þp ¼
¼ 3pq2q28 pqð Þ24p2þ8pqþq4q2ð Þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq 4p2þ8pqþq4q2ð Þp :
ð5Þ
Fig. 11 q= qþ 1ð Þ < pT < ffiffiffiqp 2
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The denominator of the second derivative is positive. The minimum value of the
numerator is q 2q ffiffiffiffiffi2qpð Þ=2, which is positive if q>0.5. Thus, for q>0.5, this
segment of the profit function is convex, which implies that there cannot be an
interior maximum. Since the profit function is continuous and differentiable at
p ¼ q2 qþ 1ð Þ, this implies that optimal p < q2 qþ 1ð Þ.
(b) q= qþ 1ð Þ < p  q2 qþ 1ð Þ. Here, the profit function is π ¼ p 2q 2p 1ð Þ=
2 q 1ð Þð Þ. It is easy to show that the maximal profit is obtained at p ¼ 2q 1ð Þ=4,
which satisfies p < q2

qþ 1ð Þ for all relevant q and which satisfies p >
q= qþ 1ð Þ if q > ffiffiffiffiffi17p þ 3 	4. Thus, there exists a maximum in this range if
q >
ffiffiffiffiffi
17
p þ 3 	4. Otherwise, the fact that the profit function is continuous and
differentiable at p ¼ q= qþ 1ð Þ implies that in the optimum p < q= qþ 1ð Þ.
(c) p  q= qþ 1ð Þ. Here, profits are π ¼ p 3qþ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq q 4p2ð Þp .4q. The first
order condition for a maximum is
@π=@p ¼ 3qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4p2ð Þp
4q
 p
2ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4p2ð Þp ¼ 0:
After some transformations, this condition simplifies to 16p4 þ 5p2q 2q2 ¼ 0,
which has a unique real and nonnegative solution, p ¼ ffiffiffiffiffi2qp ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  5p .8. This
satisfies p  q= qþ 1ð Þ if q  ffiffiffiffiffi17p þ 3 	4. It is easy to show that the profit
function is concave at the optimal p.
It follows from (a), (b) and (c) that the optimal p ¼ pm ¼ 2q 1ð Þ=4 if q >ffiffiffiffiffi
17
p þ 3 	4 and p ¼ pl ¼ ffiffiffiffiffi2qp ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  5p .8 if 1 < q  ffiffiffiffiffi17p þ 3 	4.
Case 2 0.25≤q≤1. Here, the demand function in period T is given by Lemma 2.
Unlike in Case 1, it now also depends on xT−1. The optimal price in period T will
thus also depend on xT−1. (Note that since the time horizon of the firm is infinite, it
will not depend on T). However, we do not need to consider each initial market share
separately. Note the following:
– For a given pT, all initial market shares xT1 > 3q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4p2Tð Þ
p .
4q result in
the same xT and the same holds for all xT1 < ðqþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p Þ.
4q. Moroever, qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p .
4q > 0:25 and

3qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4p2Tð Þ
p .
4q < 0:75 for all pT .
– In period 0, x0=0 and in all subsequent periods, either xT ¼

3qþffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4p2Tð Þ
p .
4q > 0:75 or xT ¼ q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p .
4q < 0:25.
Fig. 13 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 < pT < q2 qþ 1ð Þ
Fig. 12 q2

qþ 1ð Þ < pT < q= qþ 1ð Þ
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It follows that, to characterize fully the optimal pricing path of the firm, it is
enough to find the optimal price for xT−1<0.25 and xT−1>0.75.
Suppose first that the discount factor δ=0, and so only current profits count.
Below, in (1) we calculate the optimum price for xT−1>0.75, and in then in (2) we do
the same for xT−1<0.25.
(1) xT−1>0.75. The profit function is
ΠT ¼ 0 if pT  q;
ΠT ¼ pT q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p .
4q if
ffiffiffi
q
p 
2 < pT < q;
ΠT ¼ pT 3qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
qðq 4p2T Þ
p .
4q if pT  ffiffiffiqp 2:
ð6Þ
Note that the price that maximizes current profits must either satisfy
ffiffiffi
q
p 
2 <
pT < q, or pT  ffiffiffiqp 2. In the former case, the period T−profits will be less than
q/4. If, on the other hand, pT  ffiffiffiqp 2, then ΠT ¼ pT 3qþ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq q 4p2Tð Þp .4q.
We have shown in subcase (c) of Case 1 that this is maximized for
pT ¼ ffiffiffiffiffi2qp ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  5p .8, which always satisfies pT  ffiffiffiqp 2. In this case,
xT  0:82 > 0:75 and ΠT  0:39 ffiffiffiqp > q=4. This implies that optimal pT ¼ pl ¼ffiffiffiffiffi
2q
p ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
3
ffiffiffiffiffi
17
p  5
p .
8.
(2) xT−1<0.25. Here the profit function in period T is:
ΠT ¼ 0 if pT  q;
ΠT ¼ pT q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p .
4q if 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 < pT < q;
ΠT ¼ pT 3qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4p2Tð Þ
p .
4q if pT  2q ffiffiffiqp 	2:
ð7Þ
Here, either (a) 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2pT < q or (b) pT  2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 is optimal. We
consider these two price ranges in turn.
(a) 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 < pT < q. Then, xT<0.25, and profits in period T are
ΠT ¼ pT q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p .
4q, which corresponds to subcase
(a) of Case 1 above. We have shown that this profit function is convex if q≥0.5.
This implies that, in this price range, the optimal price is pT ¼
2q ffiffiffiqp 	2þ ", which gives ΠT ¼ q 2q ffiffiffiqp 	4. However, setting a price
just outside this range, pT ¼ 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 gives a market share xT>0.75 and
higher profits. Thus, if q≥0.5, then the optimal price lies in range (b).
Suppose now that q<0.5. Then, the profit function is concave for some pT and
thus there might be a local maximum in this range. To find this maximum, we
need to take a derivative of the profit function with respect to pT, which gives
dπT
dpT
¼ 8p
2
T  12pTq qþ 4q2
4
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q 4q2 þ 8pTq 4p2Tð Þ
p þ 1
4
:
Comparing this to zero we obtain two solutions:
p0 ¼ 2q3 þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q2
32 þ q
3
216 þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q5
6912 þ q
4
1536  q
3
4096
q
3
r
þ q=16þq
2=36ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q2
32þ q
3
216þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q5
6912þ q
4
1536 q
3
4096
p
3
q ;
p ¼ 2q3 þ i
ffiffi
3
p
2  12
  ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q2
32 þ q
3
216 þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q5
6912 þ q
4
1536  q
3
4096
q
3
r
 i
ffiffi
3
p
2 þ 12
 
q=16þq2=36ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q2
32þ q
3
216þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q5
6912þ q
4
1536 q
3
4096
p
3
q :
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Two cases can arise here. If q > q000 ¼ 3 ffiffiffi3p 2 9=4  0:35, then q5=6912þ
q4

1536 q34096 > 0, and thus p′ is the only real solution. In that case, p′ is
the only potential maximum in this range. However, since the second derivative of
the profit function, given by Eq. 5, is positive for pT > 2q=3, p′ must be a
minimum. Thus, when q > 3
ffiffiffi
3
p 
2 9=4, then the optimum price lies in range (b).
The second case is q < 3
ffiffiffi
3
p 
2 9=4. In that case, p′ is no longer a real
number.5 However, it can be shown6 that, in that case, p″ is real and can take
three values:
p00 1ð Þ ¼ 2q3 
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ9ð Þ
p
6 cos
πθ
3
 	
;
p00 2ð Þ ¼ 2q3 
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ9ð Þ
p
6 cos
πþθ
3
 	
;
p00 3ð Þ ¼ 2q3 
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ9ð Þ
p
6 cos
θþ3π
3
 	 ¼ 2q3 þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ9ð Þ
p
6 cos
θ
3
 	
;
where cos q ¼ 2q 4qþ27ð Þ
4qþ9ð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ9ð Þ
p and sin q ¼ 3
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
3 2772q16q2ð Þ
p
4qþ9ð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ9ð Þ
p .
We need to determine whether one of them could be the optimum price satisfying
the condition 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 < pT < q and if so, which one. Note that, if q≤1,
then 0≤cosθ≤1 and 0≤sinθ≤1, which implies that 0≤θ≤π/2. This in turn means
t h a t cos θ πð Þ=3ð Þ > cos θ=3ð Þ > cos θþ πð Þ=3ð Þ > 0, a n d t h u s
p00 3ð Þ > p00 2ð Þ > p00 1ð Þ. It can be checked that @πT=@pT < 0 if pT < p00
1ð Þ or
p00 2ð Þ < pT < p00
3ð Þ and @πT=@pT > 0 otherwise, which implies that p00
2ð Þ is the
unique maximum of the profit function. We still need to check that
2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 < p00 2ð Þ < q. It can immediately be seen that p00 2ð Þ < q and from
0≤θ≤π/2 it follows that
p00 2ð Þ ¼ 2q
3

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ 9ð Þp
6
cos
πþ θ
3

 
>
2q
3

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ 9ð Þp
12
>
2q ffiffiffiqp
2
:
It follows that, for q<q″′, there exists a local optimum pT ¼ ps ¼ 2q3 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ9ð Þ
p
6 cos
πþθ
3
 	, in which xT<0.25.
(b) pT  2q ffiffiffiqp 	2. Here, xT>0.75 and ΠT ¼ pT 3qþ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiq q 4p2Tð Þp .4q,
which corresponds to subcase (c) of Case 1. We have shown that the
profit function is maximized for pT ¼
ffiffiffiffiffi
2q
p ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
3
ffiffiffiffiffi
17
p  5
p .
8. This satisfies
pT  2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 if q > q00  3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p þ 3þ 4 ffiffiffi2p ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  5p .32  0:96. Other-
wise, optimal pT ¼ 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2.
Combining (a) and (b), we can distinguish three ranges of q. If q″<q<1, then
optimal pT=p
l, which leads to xT>0.75. If q″′<q<q″, then optimal pT=p
u which
results in xT>0.75. Finally, if 0.25<q<q″′, two local maxima exist: p
u and ps. If
ΠT xs; puð Þ > ΠT xs; psð Þ, (recall that xs denotes any market share lower than 0.25),
then pu will be chosen, otherwise ps is optimal. For example, when q=0.25,
then pT ¼ 2q=3
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ 9ð Þp 6 cos πþ θð Þ=3ð Þ is the global optimum, when
q ¼ 3 ffiffiffi3p 2 9=4, then pT ¼ 2q ffiffiffiqp 	2 is.
5If q ¼ 3 ffiffiffi3p 2 9=4, then both p′ and p″ are real, but only p″ is a maximum.
6Calculations available by request.
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Suppose now that δ>0, which means that the firm cares about future profits. Note
that, since a higher market share in period T increases profits in period T+1, higher δ
increases incentives to gain a xT>0.75 in period T. We have shown in (1) that, if
xT−1>0.75, then the price that maximizes current profits, p
l, leads to xT>0.75, and
thus pl will also be optimal when δ>0. Suppose now that xT−1>0.25. In that case, we
have shown in (2) that, when q>q″′, the price that maximizes current profits,
pT=p
l for q>q″ and pT=p
u for q″′<q<q″, leads to xT>0.75, and thus it is also
optimal when δ>0. If, on the other hand, q<q″′, we have shown that, for δ=0, two
local maxima exist, pu leading to a large, and ps to a small market share. If δ>0
then pu will be chosen if it leads to higher total discounted profits. Thus
Πu þ δ= 1 δð ÞΠl > 1= 1 δð ÞΠs;
with Πu, Πl and Πs are defined as in footnote 4. Otherwise, ps will be chosen.
Case 3 q<0.25. Here, the demand function is given by Lemma 3. Here again the
demand in period T depends on the initial market share in a similar way as when
0.25≤q≤1. However, note that, if x0<0.25, then xT>0.75 will never arise. That is
because in this situation attaining a large market share requires p1  2q ffiffiffiqp 	2,
which for q<0.25 contradicts p1≥0. It follows, then, that for every T, xT−1<0.25.
Thus, the profit function in each period is
ΠT ¼ 0 if pT  q;
ΠT ¼ q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4p2T þ 8pTqþ q 4q2ð Þ
p .
4q if pT < q:
In Case 2.(2) subcase (a) we have shown that for this demand function there
exists an interior profit-maximizing price if q>q″′. This price is given by
pT ¼ ps ¼ 2q3 
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q 4qþ 9ð Þp
6
cos
p þ q
3

 
< q:
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3 We analyze the social welfare in the long run for different
values of q in turn.
(1) If q≥q′, then the long run solution is p ¼ 2q 1ð Þ=4 and x ¼ 2q 1ð Þ=
4q 4ð Þ > 0:5. Since p<q and pþ q 1ð Þ=2 < x < pþ 1ð Þ=2, the equilibri-
um situation is as in Fig. 5b and ΔGCS1, ΔCS0 and ΔSW are given by
ΔGCS1 ¼ ∫10∫
1
p
qþ12xq β αq β 1 xðð Þdαdβ ¼
36q336q2þ9q2
96q q1ð Þ ;
ΔCS0 ¼ ∫10∫
p
qþ12xq β
0 βxð Þdαd ¼ 
2q1ð Þ 6q29q1ð Þ
96q q1ð Þ2 ;
ΔSW ¼ ΔGCS1 þΔCS0 ¼ 3q1ð Þ 12q
324q2þ15q1ð Þ
96q q1ð Þ :
Analyzing these expressions we see that if q≥q′, then ΔGCS1>0, ΔCS0<0 and
ΔSW>0.
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(2) If 0:25  q < q0, then the long run solution with p ¼ ffiffiffiffiffi2qp ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi3 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  5p .8 and x ¼ffiffiffiffiffi
17
p þ 9 	16 > 0:5 is possible. Since p<q and x > pþ 1ð Þ=2, the equilib-
rium situation is as in Fig. 5c and ΔGCS1, ΔCS0 and ΔSW are given by
ΔGCS1 ¼ ∫
p
2x1
0 ∫
1
p
q2x1q β αq βð1 xð Þdαdβþ∫
1
p
2x1
∫10 αq βð1 xð Þdαdβ ¼
¼  3q15qx2p33q2þ24qx2þ3p3xþ12q2x12qx212q2x2
6q 2x1ð Þ2 ¼
¼ 0:5q 7 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  33 	 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi6 ffiffiffiffiffi17p  10p ffiffiffiqp þ ffiffiffiffiffi17p  7 	32;
ΔCS0 ¼ ∫
p
2x1
0 ∫
p
q2x1q β
0 βxð Þdαdβ ¼  xp
3
6q 2x1ð Þ2 ¼ 
3
ffiffiffiffi
17
p 5ð Þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi3 ffiffiffiffi17p 5p ffiffi2p
768
ffiffiffi
q
p
;
ΔSW ¼ 0:5q 5
ffiffiffiffi
17
p 19ð Þ 6 ffiffiffiffi17p 10ð Þ ffiffiqp
384 þ
ffiffiffiffi
17
p 7
32 :
Analyzing these expressions we see that if q>0.25, then ΔGSC1>0, ΔCS0<0 and
ΔSW>0.
(3) If q<q′″, then the long run solution with p=ps and x<0.25 is possible. Since
p<q and x < pþ q 1ð Þ=2, the equilibrium is as in Fig. 5a and ΔGCS1,
ΔCS0 and ΔSW are given by
ΔGCS1 ¼ ∫
qp
12x
0 ∫
1
p
qþ12xqp β αq β 1 xðð Þdαdβ ¼
qpð Þ2 5pqþq2þ3 pþqð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q24q3þ8pq24p2q
p 	
6 qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q24q3þ8pq24p2q
p 	2 ;
ΔCS0 ¼ ∫
qp
12x
0 ∫
p
qþ12xq β
0 βxð Þdαdβþ∫
1
qp
12x
∫10 βxð Þdαdβ ¼
¼  3q2 qpð Þ
36 qpð Þ2þ3
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q24q3þ8pq24p2q
p 	
q
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q qþ8pq4p24q2ð Þ
p 	
12 qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q qþ8pq4p24q2ð
p 	 ;
ΔSW ¼ ΔGCS1 þΔCS0 ¼  qþ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q24q3þ8pq24p2q
p 	
qpð Þ2 34p2qð Þ
12q q2 qpð Þ2þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q q4 qpð Þ2ð Þp 	 :
Analyzing these expressions we see that if q<q″′, then ΔGCS1>0, ΔCS0<0 and
ΔSW<0.
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